____Relations among the EU, China and the US
I. Introduction
Two years ago, discussions had been hotly held within the EU on the question of lifting the embargo on arms exports to the People’s Republic of China. The prospect that the EU would lift its embargo on arms exports to China has led to a number of on-going discussions between EU member states and the US.
The US government strongly opposed lifting the embargo at that time on human rights and security issues grounds. However, core member states of the EU, particularly France and Germany, strongly supported lifting of the embargo. And, the UK had advised the Bush Administration that it would also support lifting the embargo when the subject is formally addressed by the EU, most likely during the early spring of 20051.
Arms embargo, as a discriminatory policy to China, has made China be at an unequal status in the international market, so China had been seeking to ask the EU to lift it. Lifting the embargo had become an important symbolic political act by the EU, and a Cold War era relic, and thus an impediment to better relations with European Union members. France, Germany, and other EU members claim the embargo hinders stronger EU political and economic relations with China. After their December 16 and 17, 2004 meeting, EU leaders pledged to address lifting the embargo2. The Council of the EU noted that if the arms embargo on China were to be lifted, that action should not result in either a quantitative or qualitative increase in EU arms exports to China3. The United Kingdom has argued that it believes that the European Union’s Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, while not legally binding, would, with some enhancements, provide a solid safeguard against worrisome arms exports by EU states to the Chinese in the future4.
Unfortunately, the hope was killed in June of 2005 for strongly interferences of the US into the EU. The discussion was eliminated and the problem was put in box and no body argued it any more.
Why it is so hard for the EU to make the decision to lift arms embargo on China, which will surely bring benefits for it?
This article draws an outline of the origination and development of this problem, emphasizes on main reasons for the EU not to lift arms embargo on China, and deliver some possible measures for the future.
II. The EU arms embargo on China
A. Derive of this problem and it’s influence to China and the EU
After World War II was ended, the East and West blocs of the formation of the Cold War started to limit the Western industrialized countries selling socialist countries the high-tech strategic goods. The US in November 1949 established the so-called "Export Control Co-coordinating Committee", headquartered in Paris, also known as "the Paris Commission" and short for Batumi. China was not its initially regulatory object until July of 1950.
The relation between China and West countries became eased after President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972. The US began to broaden export policy to China, followed by the EU. In the same year, China obtained same status as the SU from the Batumi, but until 1981 China could not import more advanced technologies from the US and other West countries. Subsequently, negotiations were launched between China and French, Italy on importing military equipments and technologies and arms sale relationship was established between China and the EU. From December 1985, the Batumi adopted more relaxed Green Policy which made military technological cooperation between China and the EU developing quickly.
On June 27, 1989 the European Council, convened in Madrid, agreed to impose an arms embargo on China. The arms embargo against China has not been interpreted uniformly by the EU members since it was imposed. This has been attributed to several factors, including lack of specificity in the political declaration, absence of a legally binding document, such as a Common Position, as is the case with subsequent embargoes imposed on other countries and, more importantly, the existing loopholes and weak points in the EU arms control system. For instance, the UK interpreted the embargo in a narrow manner, as to include the following items: lethal weapons such as machine guns, large-caliber weapons, bombs, torpedoes and missiles; specially designed components of the above, and ammunition; military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armored fighting vehicles and other weapons platforms; and equipment which might be used for internal repression5. The French have interpreted the embargo similarly.6
Since 1989, European non-governmental organizations have reported that the embargo on China has been bypassed by several EU members and has been reduced to a mere “symbolic instrument.7” One arms trade expert with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) of Sweden has stated that “many European licenses for the arms trade are actually issued for material which, on paper, can be used for civilian purposes; what is known as ‘dual usage’… The embargo has actually been circumvented in this way for years.8” Amnesty International in its 2004 report, Undermining Global Security: the European Union Arms Exports, contains several examples of EU members that have made exports to China within the framework of the existing arms embargo9. For instance, the United Kingdom exported components for Chinese military aero engines as well as technology, software and related systems for weapons platforms; an Italian joint venture company was involved in the manufacture of vehicles reportedly used as mobile execution chambers in China. In addition, the German Deutz AG diesel engines were incorporated into armored personnel carriers that were transferred to China10.
Recently, China requires the EU to lift the unequal ban on arms sales in many occasions. On 13th October 2003, the Chinese government issued China's EU Policy Paper, spelling out objectives of China's EU policy and outlining plans and measures on bilateral cooperation in the coming five years, in which it stated that the EU should lift its ban on arms sales to China at an early date so as to remove barriers to greater bilateral cooperation on defense industry and technologies11.
China’s requirement was responded and advanced by French President Chirac and German Prime Minister Schroeder. The EU 15 members agreed to consider lifting this ban on European Submit on 13th December 2003. On 26th January 2004, the EU Council of Foreign Minister discussed this problem and required the Political and Security Commission to deliberate the proposal. On 18th December 2004, the European Submit declared again the political aspiration to lift arms embargo on China and required the Rotation Presidency State Luxemburg go on to work so as to conclude agreement after June of 2005.
However, the EU did not abide this promise. On 13th June 2005, Conference of the EU Foreign Minister discussed and at last dropped the plan which was decided to lift arms embargo on China in June of 2005, and expressed that they would set no time table on this question. From then on, this hot question became cold and there has been not any progress up to now.
B. Strong tendency to lift this embargo
Even contemporary the EU is reluctant to lift arms embargo against China, this is absolutely a historical tendency and no body can restrict it.
1. The product of Cold War should be dropped
This embargo is a product of Cold War mentality. China has been subjected to the Western embargo and blockade. In November 1949, the United States and its Western allies in Paris, the establishment of secret "Paris Output Control Commission" right Including China, the socialist countries were imposed a comprehensive arms embargo. Implementation of this policy continued for as long as two or three decades up to end of the 1980s and early 1990s; the international political situation had undergone great changes. Subsequently, in June 1989, President Bush announced the United States would imposed sanctions on China and then stopped all military sales to China. The U.S. Senate also passed a resolution demanding that the allies of the United States agreed to carry out military sanctions to China. EC Summit announced immediately to suspend military cooperation and arms trade between its members states and China. The ban has been in use ever since.
The EU ban on arms sales to China in the last century the late 1980s that the special historical period to make political decisions. EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson, when visiting Beijing February of 2005, said: "The arms embargo is a product of the Cold War." This is political discrimination facilitated by the West against China during the Cold War. French President Jacques Chirac made clear that the EU ban on arms sales to China today, "has not been in keeping with contemporary political and social reality… had never been justified."
Compared with the 1980s and 1990s, the international strategic situation has undergone great changes. The Cold War lasting for half a century has ended, and the bipolar pattern has been dissolved, which makes maintaining common western camp meaningless to exist without political reasons. In a diverse world, all countries of the world strategic interests are not the same. The United States of America has the interests of Europe European interests, so it tries to continue maintaining the shadow of the Cold War confrontation, which is not only inconsistent with the trend of the times, nor is it compatible with the European countries strategic interests.
2. Development of relationship between China and the EU
In the context of globalization, Europe and China's economic, political relations have become increasingly close, and showed more and more growing interdependence. In particular, the beginning of the new century, China and the EU, on the equal and mutually beneficial basis, comprehensively promoted the strategic partnership, targeting to the mutually political trust, economic and trade exchanges, security consultation, and technical cooperation. In 2004 the EU became China's largest trading partner and China becomes the EU's second largest trading partner. The bilateral trade volume came to over 150 billion U.S. dollars. In 2004 the EU and China signed "Galileo satellite navigation cooperation agreements". China and the EU launched a remote sensing satellite largest cooperation project "Dragon" to the EU in high-tech areas of cooperation providing a good example. Clearly, the continuation of the arms embargo on China is not appropriate.
Growing political and economic reform in-depth, high-speed economic growth comes true in China, as a confident, prosperous, responsible big country to be recognized by the international community. As former French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin said, "China today is the EU's special partner, and China has got an important position in the international community." China's development was further explanation that the Western embargo is discriminatory founded. Quickly lifting the arms embargo on China and the elimination of the Cold War relic of the era will correct this error, which is absolutely necessary for the wise.
3. The rationale of arms embargo has disappeared
The only rationale of the EU to enhance arms embargo on China is that Chinese Government paid little attention to human rights. Under this premise, supporting China's transition to an open society based on the rule of law and the respect for Human rights is central to EU-China relations.
The EU has committed to promote Human rights in China in an active, sustained and constructive way. Over the last decade, human rights have been mainly discussed between the EU and China in the framework of both their political dialogue as well as a specific dialogue. This dialogue was set up in 1995. Two rounds of the dialogue take place every year, under every EU Presidency. It allows the EU to channel all issues of concern (such as the death penalty, re-education through labor, ethnic minorities' rights, civil and political freedoms, individual cases etc.) in a forum where China is committed to responding. The dialogue, together with pressure from other international partners, has contributed to yield some concrete results (visits to China by the UN Commissioner for Human Rights, signing of the UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, signing and ratification of the UN Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, release of prisoners, setting up of Commission co-operation projects etc).
Human rights situation in China has improved sufficiently even in the eyes of the US and therefore the original rationale for the embargo no longer applies.
4. The Embargo: an empty shell
In fact, the “embargo” is nothing more than a single sentence in a 1989 communiqué, and is nothing more than a voluntary proclamation by the EU member states at the time. As such, it is not legally binding and does not have strict enforcement mechanisms, is becoming increasingly “leaky” in any event, and should be scrapped. What’s more, all of its other 1989 sanctions have long been lifted by the EU, and thus maintaining this one is anachronistic.
While the Europeans balked at selling China complete weapons systems during the 1990s, their arms embargo was honored more in the breach than in the observance.
Between 1993 and 2002, France sold over $US122 million in defense goods to China. The United Kingdom sold China Racal/Thales Skymaster airborne early warning radar systems and Spey aero-engines for Chinese JH-7 fighter-bombers. The University of Surrey cooperated in China’s micro-satellite development, a technology; the Chinese acknowledge will be used in ‘parasitic’ anti-satellite weapons12. At sea, German and French marine diesel engines power new Chinese submarine and surface combatants. Germany’s MTU is co-producing marine diesel in China to power China’s new Song A-class submarines. French-designed Semt Pielstick marine diesels power the new very stealthy Chinese 054-class frigate13.
Between 2002 and 2003, the European Union almost doubled its arms export licenses for China, raising questions about its insistence on having no intention of increasing its sales, once it lifts its arms embargo on China. The EU annual report on arms exports shows that the value of EU licenses for selling arms to China totaled €416 million ($US544 million) in 2003 compared to €210 million in 2002. According to the information in the EU Official Journal issued in December 2004, France granted €171 million worth of licenses for arms sales to China in 2003, Italy €127 million, and the UK €112 million, showing all figures well above the €210 million level of 200214.
It is evident that even with the embargo in place, the licenses for arms sales to China granted by EU member states have increased rather than decreased. Thus, the EU arms embargo on China has proved to be inefficient, simply a political statement, and lacks legal basis and strict EU-wide enforcement mechanisms. It is also true that the embargo has not been a complete prohibition on defense technology or component transfers to China.
III. Factors halting the pace of the EU
Over the years, sound supporting to lift the EU’s arms embargo on China is growing louder and louder. France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and other EU countries and the EU Council has issued a statement, calling for an early change in the span between the EU and China. However, the unhappy resolution of the EU Summit in June of 2005 gave us a clue that this problem would not be so easy to resolve. There are two aspects of potential reasons for this. The first is external pressure from the US and other Western countries; the other is internal problem within the EU.
A. External pressures from the US to the EU
1. Reluctant to see a strong China with competitiveness
That the ban of arms sales is insisted so strongly by the US is in order to prevent the U.S.-led unipolar structure and the Cold War system from being collapsed. Maintaining the arms embargo, weaving a containment network for China is one of most important measures of the United States to maintain the outdated Cold War order and lead a dominant role in the European affairs.
Especially, the US has been always treating China as its potential and most important competitor in the international community. A strong China, in particular a China with powerful defense force, will absolutely threaten the dominant position of the US.
2. Be afraid military power across Taiwan Strait out of balance
The second worry from the US is that there will be risk, in the possible Taiwan conflicts, for the US army to confront military equipments and technologies originated from the US or other Western countries, which also may enhance the possibility for China to use force in resolving Taiwan issues. Out of this consideration, the US compelled the EU not to lift the embargo in order to maintain a balance of military power across the Strait and support that the US will possess overwhelming advantage once it interferes Taiwan issues. A commenter of Washington Observe said that the reason for the US to adhere the arms embargo on China is not that the US is afraid to be defeated in military conflicts but that it promises the least loss the US would cost.
3. Be afraid the EU go too closer with China
The US is afraid that the EU will go too closer with China strategically, so it tried its best to delay the development of China and maintain a "strategic gap" in between. Fundamentally speaking, the United States has always considered China as a potential competitor; China's development will never be allowed to challenge the US’s core interests of the great powers. If China and the EU go closer, the structure of international strategic pattern will be finally influenced and develops in the direction of multi-polarization. If the lifting of the EU arms embargo on China comes true, China will be more in relaxed strategic environment, which is not the situation the United States and Japan want to see.
4. Maintaining dominant role in European affairs
The US has been always very cautious to control the Europe in his hands. Through the maintenance of the arms embargo on China, the US may be able to continue maintaining the EU political and military influence on European states, intervening European affairs, and counteracting the developing deviation power of the EU.
Lifting arms embargo is consider being the second affair the EU made its own decision without instruction from the US besides the Iraq War 2003. Integration of the EU requires real capability of foreign diplomacy and defense. If all the 27 members manage to achieve unanimity on this problem, political integration will be encouraged and advanced, which, of course, will bring a huge strike to the dominant position of the US in the Europe.
B. Internal problem
1. Obstacles of decision making regime
If the proposal to lift the ban on China is passed, all 27 members should agree unanimously. This decision-making regime adds difficulty to this problem. Inside the EU, some major States such as France, Germany and Italy support to cancel the ban on China according to strategies and economic interest. But some middle and small States are not so agreeable to see that, mainly because that they keep prejudice to China, considering there is serious human rights problem in China, worrying China will strike Taiwan, and thinking that the lift will bring nothing good for them as they do not have military trades with China.
2. Human rights problem
Beside some Northern European countries object to lift the ban for human rights problem, the European Parliament, Parliaments, Parties and Human Right organizations of some member states join in to oppose to dismiss the ban and load influence to national government.
On 18 December 2003, under the reason that human rights situation in China was still unsatisfactory and there were no sufficient excuse to lift the ban, the EU Parliament passed a resolution to maintain arms embargo on China, which brought negative influence to governments of the EU member states. For another example, even though Netherland government agreed to dismiss the ban, the Netherland Parliament passed a similar resolution which made the government difficult to draw decision. Green Party and Social & Democratic Party proposed a joint bill to require China ratify carry out ICCPR, actualize human rights and private property protection provisions in the new modified Constitution, and further improve automatic rights of minorities.
3. Negative influence from stagnancy of European integration
The European Constitution was rejected in referendums of France and Dutch respectively in 2005, which caused negative influence to the issue of lifting arms embargo. The veto of the EU Constitution drew more attention of the EU to eliminate internal handicap and problem and weakened the consideration of international problems.
4. A Strengthened Code of Conduct and Export Controls will be Effective
The Parliament, governments and Parties of some member states insist that there should be a forceful code for conduct of arms exportation which regulate in details about standards and quantity of weapons exported to China and other third countries.
A strengthened Code of Conduct had been in preparation in Brussels for over a year. The proof will be in the pudding of the new Code, but EU officials already admit that it will not be legally binding and will remain substantially up to each member state to interpret15. Moreover, there will be no provisions for dual-use technologies (civilian technologies with military application), which fall under the Wassenaar Arrangement. European export controls – particularly at the EU level – are in real need of strengthening, particularly in the wake of the 2004 inclusion of ten new East and Central European member states16. There may also be a need for replacing the defunct COCOM and dysfunctional Wassenaar Arrangement17. Even if such a broader mechanism is not put in place, there is still a need for regular and institutionalized cross-checking and monitoring of export license applications between the EU and U.S. prior to their issuance.
IV. Looking forward
It is obvious that lifting arms embargo on China is not a question about “Whether” but a question of “When”. However, achievement of this target calls for political wisdom.
A. Strengthen the strategic relationship between China and the EU
Economic cooperation relationship between China and the EU has become relative mature, but political and strategic and security relationships are comparatively weak. Both China and the EU are changing from regional power to a global one. In this progress, enhancing and deepening mutual relationship, enlarging mutual respect and improving international position of ourselves are common targets of the both entities. Lifting arms embargo will absolutely bring interests to both sides, but it also needs hand work from them. New effort should be made to facilitate political and strategic and security cooperation, one of the most premise is that principles of mutual trust, equal treat and respect counterpart’s interests should be abided.
B. Focusing on persuading Member States of the EU
Even the EU has arrived at integration at a considerable level; member states are still most important subjects to decide foreign policies. MS possess the leading power to control strategic and security affairs. Following enlargement of the EU, member states become more and more, and their interest become more and more diversified and difficult to harmonize. Factual importance of core states like France and Germany has declined. This new situation suggests that if China wants the EU to reach an agreement to lift the arms embargo, it has to do homework towards member states of the EU, not just staying at the Union level. Targets and requirements of policies towards China of the EU and its member states are not exactly the same. Different state emphasizes in different areas according to its own political and economic benefits. The contemporary work for China to do is to motivate enthusiasm to improve relation with China and restrain negative factors interfering and holding down strategic relationship between China and the EU.
C. Concerning the tri-angle relations among China, the EU and the US
As discussed above, the power of the US should never be overstepped in dealing with the problem of arms embargo. Stable relationship between China and the US is the precondition to create a kind of loosely outer environment for relationship between China and the EU. Accordingly, when developing bilateral relationship with any giant entity or country, China should clearly persist in excluding not any third entity and pointing at no third entities. Keeping peace, developing and cooperating are fundamental principles in dealing with relations between China and the EU and the US, which will finally accomplish a benign, interact in the triangle relations among China, the EU and the US.
Reference：
Journal
Asian Wall Street Journal
Far Eastern Economic Review
The Nonproliferation Review (Summer 2003)
Newspaper
Current Affairs
Financial Times
Space News International
Dow Jones International News
Aviation Week & Space Technology
Document
China’s EU Policy Paper (2003)
Council of the European Union, 16/17 December 2004. Presidency Conclusions. 16238/1/04 REV 1, p. 19. Published on February 1, 2005.
Robin Niblett, The United States, the European Union, and Lifting the Arms Embargo on China, 10 EURO-FOCUS no. 3 (Sept 30, 2004). Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Seema Gahlaut, Michael Beck, Scott Jones, and Dan Joyner, Roadmap for Reform: Creating a New Multilateral Export Control Regime (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security, 2004)
1 “Germany: Schroeder Calls for EU to End China Arms Embargo,” Dow Jones International News, December 6, 2004; “France reiterates support for end to China arms embargo,” Agence France Presse, December 6, 2004.
2 Peter Sparaco and Robert Wall, “Chinese Checkers; Widening business opportunities drive EU’s review of China arms embargo,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 13, 2004, p. 37.
3 Council of the European Union, 16/17 December 2004. Presidency Conclusions. 16238/1/04 REV 1, p. 19. Published February 1, 2005.
4 Marc Champion, “EU Aims to Calm U.S. Arms Fears–Officials say likely end to Sales Embargo on China won’t increase imports,” Asian Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2005, p. A1.
5 Robin Niblett, The United States, the European Union, and Lifting the Arms Embargo on China, 10 EURO-FOCUS no. 3 (Sept 30, 2004). Center for Strategic and International Studies.
6 EU arms embargo on China. [http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/euframe/euchiemb.htm]
7 Thijs Papot, “‘A Symbolic Instrument’” the EU’s arms embargo against China,” Current Affairs, January 25, 2005.
8 Ibid.
9 Amnesty International. Undermining Global Security: The European Union Exports. Available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engact300032004
10 Press Release of Coalition of European NGOs including Saferworld, Oxfam, Pax Christi, and Amnesty International: “Flimsy Controls Fail to Prevent EU Countries Selling Arms to Human Rights Abusers.” September 30, 2004.
11 See China’s EU Policy Paper (2003).
12 Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 August 2004, 27.
13 Space News International, 14 February 2005, 19.
14 Financial Times, 18 January 2005.
15 Apparently, there is some consideration being given to making the revised Code legally binding. See Daniel Dombey, “EU Considers Binding Rules on Arms Sales,” Financial Times, April 18, 2005.
16 See Scott Jones, “EU Enlargement: Implications for EU and Multilateral Export Controls,” The Nonproliferation Review (Summer 2003), pp. 1-10.
17 See Seema Gahlaut, Michael Beck, Scott Jones, and Dan Joyner, Roadmap for Reform: Creating a New Multilateral Export Control Regime (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security, 2004).
